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But what’s a judge to do? 
 
Professor Sanders offers a convincing argument that some 
degree of paternalism is appropriate in guarding against 
misinterpretation of complex scientific and technical evidence by lay 
jurors, especially when jurors must consider statistical and 
probabilistic evidence.  His review of research suggest that jurors 
often respond to complex evidence by engaging “in peripheral 
processing when accessing expert testimony and that peripheral cues 
[e.g., credentials and demeanor] take on added significance as the 
scientific issues in the case become more complex.”1  The fact that 
such evidence is embedded in an adversarial presentation intended 
to favor the presenting side makes it even less accessible.  Sanders 
concludes that if the purpose of the trial is to ascertain the truth, 
some restriction on admissibility of evidence is appropriate to 
maximize the likelihood of arriving at a correct answer. 
Professor Cohen complicates the issue considerably by pointing 
out that the legal system, in making a gatekeeping determination, 
must accommodate values that go beyond the values of the sciences.  
More specifically, the legal system weighs the cost of errors differently 
and “the fact that a ‘mainstream’ scientist would not testify as to a 
particular conclusion does not necessarily mean that the same 
conclusion is valueless or ‘junk science’ for the purposes of law.”2  
Cohen is particularly concerned that in focusing on scientific 
“knowledge” the courts will misunderstand “how data (i.e., evidence) 
is utilized to develop statements of ‘knowledge’ in scientific 
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 1 Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of 
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communities consistent with the norms of those communities—
norms that differ fundamentally from the norms of civil litigation.”3 
One focal point of the tension between law and science arises in 
the many circumstances in which science would conclude that a 
relationship is “‘suggested but not proven.’”4  This typically occurs 
when a research study finds an effect that points in the direction of 
an association, but cannot rule out the possibility that the 
observations are a product of chance, perhaps due to a small sample 
size.  In such a circumstance, the researchers will suspend judgment, 
an option that is not available to legal factfinders.  Cohen points out 
that the legal system will often translate such uncertainty into a 
decision to exclude the evidence, to the detriment of the plaintiff 
who has the burden of proof.  In doing so, the courts may 
inadvertently give greater weight to errors favoring defendants’ 
interests rather than errors favoring plaintiffs’ interests and thereby 
distort the values of the civil justice system, which assumes that such 
errors should be given equal weight.5  Using epidemiology evidence 
as an example, Cohen demonstrates that the conservative values 
implicit in declaring the existence of an effect place an awesome 
barrier in the path of the plaintiff who wishes to present expert 
evidence to the jury. 
Taken together, the positions of Professors Sanders and Cohen 
present a tall order for judges.  In making a gatekeeping decision 
they must not only anticipate the shortcomings of jurors in assessing 
complex evidence and exercise their authority in a way that 
strengthens the accuracy of the process, but they also must be alert to 
the tension in the values of science and law and construe “scientific 
knowledge” in a way that does not permit the implicit values of 
science to override the implicit values of civil litigation. 
If only it were so easy.  The problem is that there is not just one 
science and not one scientific method.6  Perhaps the values of the 
civil litigation system can be characterized in a uniform manner 
across a multitude of cases, but the values of science vary across the 
individual disciplines.  Each one has its own norms and standards 
that vary greatly in the rigor they impose in declaring a finding to be 
“scientific knowledge.”   
 
 3 Id. at 946. 
 4 Id. at 950. 
 5 Id. at Part II. 
 6 Sheila Jasanoff has referred to this as the “myth of the scientific method.”  
Sheila Jasanoff, Hidden Experts: Judging Science after Daubert 9-12 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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In a typical gatekeeping decision a judge is likely to find 
practitioners of many sciences, each offering information that 
conforms to the standards of his or her narrow scientific specialty.  
The differences among scientific disciplines are evident in the 
pedigree of experts as they line up at trial.  Plaintiffs often favor 
expert toxicologists, who typically rely on animal studies for 
estimating the effects of exposure on living organisms.  Although 
toxicologists may face difficult problems of extrapolation across 
species and dosage levels, they are comforted by the greater control 
over external exposures permitted by laboratory studies.7 
Defendants often favor epidemiologists, whose broad-scale 
studies of the effects of various exposures on humans avoid the 
problems of extrapolation across species and dosage levels.  
Epidemiology studies, however, are difficult to execute and subject to 
external influences that are uncontrolled by the research design, 
influences that may compromise the confidence with which the 
findings of the study may be attributed to a specific exposure.8  As 
Cohen points out, epidemiology studies are conservative in nature, 
willing to declare a causal relationship only when the statistical tests 
speak conclusively in ruling out chance as an alternative explanation, 
and when a series of additional restrictive conditions are met.9 
By focusing on epidemiology, Professors Sanders and Cohen 
consider only one scientific value system.  Other sciences endorse 
other value systems, resulting conflicts among scientists from 
different disciplines requires judges to resolve issues that the sciences 
themselves have left unresolved.  When courts are faced with 
conflicting sciences, they must choose among them, taking 
cognizance of some forms of scientific knowledge and dismissing 
others.  Such a choice is unavoidable.  In doing so, courts often 
invoke the language of science, thereby obscuring the fact that they 
are imposing legal values and standards.  Consequently, the language 
of science in the courtroom can misrepresent both the science and 
the law. 
 
 7 Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 405 (2d ed. 2000). 
 8 David P. Rall et al., Alternatives to Using Human Experience in Assessing Health 
Risks, 8 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 355, 362-63 (1987). 
 9 Cohen, supra note 2, at 951-52 (“Most commonly, the epidemiologist will 
decline to characterize the data as showing a particular relationship between A and B 
unless the probability that the relationship could have occurred by chance even in 
the absence of the observed relationship is quite low.  The most common threshold 
for such a probability is 5%.”).  See also criteria for assessing whether an association 
reflects a causal relationship in Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on 
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 376-77 (2d ed. 2000). 
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The Supreme Court has not offered much guidance to lower 
courts charged with sorting out conflicting areas of science.  
Repeatedly the Supreme Court has spoken as though there is a single 
standard of scientific values that lead to a uniform standard of 
“scientific knowledge.”  In Daubert, Justice Blackmun urged judges to 
measure the admissibility of expert testimony against the extent to 
which the testimony was based on “scientific validity,”10 and offered 
four non-exclusive factors to consider in making this assessment.  
While the Court expressly limited its holding to scientific evidence,11 
it chose not to delineate how these factors would apply across the 
range of sciences that are proffered in court. 
The difficulty of establishing a uniform standard of evidential 
reliability across competing sciences became apparent in the Court’s 
next declaration on scientific evidence.  In General Electric v. Joiner,12 
the Supreme Court indicated that: 
[n]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence 
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is 
connected to the existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  
A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical 
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.  This is what the 
District Court did here and we hold that it did not abuse its 
discretion in so doing. 
But what constitutes too great an analytical gap?  Sanders and his 
colleagues nailed the question (but not the answer, in my view) when 
they asked “[h]ow good is good enough?”13  In setting a threshold for 
admissibility, the law must endorse a single answer, while the sciences 
tolerate a multitude of answers.14 
The dilemma of competing sciences was sharpened in Kumho 
Tire Co. v. Carmichael,15 which extended the gatekeeping role beyond 
the sciences to all expert testimony.  Although the Daubert factors 
always may be considered, Justice Breyer noted that other factors may 
provide a more suitable standard for assessing such testimony.  The 
Supreme Court indicated that all expert witnesses should employ “in 
 
 10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993). 
 11 Id. at n.8. 
 12 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) 
 13 David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under 
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000); Sanders, supra note 1, at 
939. 
 14 Any notion of a monolithic science can be dispelled by examining the 271 
scientific societies affiliated the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science.  See http://www.aaas.org/about/affiliates.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2003). 
 15 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes 
the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”16  In effect, this 
decision tethered the standard for admissibility of testimony to 
standards of professional practice, and implicitly recognized that this 
standard of validity may vary within the sciences. 
Taken together, these cases leave judges struggling to resolve 
conflicting evidence from different areas of science, all of which 
employ “the same level of intellectual rigor” that is appropriate to the 
individual area of science, but which tolerate different degrees of 
extrapolation in transcending the “analytical gap” between scientific 
findings and the circumstances of the individual litigation. 
I.  THE REVEALING CASE OF SOLDO V. SANDOZ 
An especially revealing instance of the dilemma posed by 
differing standards among sciences is found in the recent district 
court decision in Soldo v. Sandoz.17  Like the Kuhn case cited by 
Sanders, Soldo is another instance of personal tragedy and uncertain 
scientific attribution.  A young mother sustained an intracranial 
hemorrhage and resulting stroke soon after giving birth.  She 
claimed that the stroke was a consequence of her ingestion of 
Parlodel, a drug manufactured and marketed by the defendant to 
prevent lactation.  Since a heightened risk of stroke occurs in the 
postpartum phase of pregnancy,18 among the tasks facing the court 
was to determine if the risk of stroke among women who had taken 
Parlodel following pregnancy exceeded the heightened base rate of 
stroke among women in the postpartum phase of pregnancy.  No 
meaningful epidemiology studies were available because the 
incidence of stroke was rare and the FDA removed the product from 
the market in 1995 following reports of adverse health effects in post-
partum women. 
The defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer challenged the 
testimony of the plaintiff’s two primary experts, Drs. Kulig and Petro, 
who were prepared to testify that they had excluded alternative 
possible causes of the stoke and were confident to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that ingestion of Parlodel caused the 
stroke. 
Soldo merits close examination because the court also appointed 
three distinguished scientists from three different disciplines to 
 
 16 Id. at 152. 
 17 Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, Civ. No. 98-1712, 2003 WL 
355931 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2003). 
 18 Id. at *10. 
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advise the court as independent experts concerning the scientific 
acceptability of the plaintiff’s expert evidence.  The three court 
appointed experts were Dr. David A. Savitz, Professor and Chair of 
the Department of Epidemiology at the University of North Carolina; 
Dr. William J. Powers, Professor in the Departments of Neurology 
and Radiology at the Washington University School of Medicine; and 
Dr. David Flockhart, Chief of the Division of Clinical Pharmacology at 
the Indiana University School of Medicine.19  The use of such 
distinguished court-appointed experts allows a clear assessment of the 
manner in which different areas of science assess similar evidence, 
unfiltered by the adversarial interests of the parties.  Unlike other 
recent instances in which courts employed panels of appointed 
experts,20 these court-appointed experts worked independently, 
remaining unaware of the identity or areas of specialization of the 
other appointed experts.  This independence permits a clear 
assessment of the perspective of the three areas of science without the 
dilution that might arise if the experts were expected to collaborate 
on a single report. 
In a lengthy order, the court sought the advice of the appointed 
experts on “whether the methodology or technique employed by 
plaintiff’s medical witnesses, Dr. Kenneth Kulig and Dr. Dennis Petro, 
in formulating their opinions [was] scientifically reliable and whether 
the methodology or technique [could] be properly applied to the 
facts of this case.”21  The court recited an expanded version of the 
Daubert factors, noting that published studies are not required to 
establish reliability; that “differential diagnosis and temporal analysis, 
properly performed, would generally meet the factors”; and that 
there must be a proper “fit” between the expert’s opinion and the 
facts of the case.22 
 
 19 The experts were selected with the assistance of the Registry of Independent 
Scientific and Technical Advisors, a program of the Private Adjudication Center at 
Duke University School of Law.  See http://www.law.duke.edu/pac/registry/ 
index.html.  The executive director of the program nominated candidates to serve as 
court appointed experts after consulting with the court regarding the areas of 
expertise that were required.  The executive director also served as a channel of 
communication between the court and the experts; no direct communication with 
the court was permitted. 
 20 Laural L. Hooper et al., Assessing Causation in Breast Implant Litigation: The Role 
of Science Panels, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (2001). 
 21 Soldo vs. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., Civ. No. 98-1712, Order of the Court, Exhibit I, 
Court’s Instructions to Experts Appointed Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, 
1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2001). 
 22 Id. at 2-3.  The court continued, “There is no ‘fit’ where there is simply too 
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered, as when an expert 
offers animal studies showing one type of cancer in laboratory mice to support 
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More specifically, the court asked each expert to respond to the 
following questions with regard to Drs. Kulig and Petro: 
1.  With a reasonable degree of medical certainty, is the 
methodology or technique employed by [the plaintiff’s expert] in 
opining that Parlodel can cause stroke and that Parlodel caused 
plaintiff’s intracerebral hemorrhage scientifically reliable? 
2.  Can the methodology or technique employed by [the 
plaintiff’s expert] be applied to the facts at issue? 
3.  If your answers to [either of these questions] are in the 
negative, to what extent, if any, should any of your opinions be 
considered subject to sufficient genuine dispute as would permit 
other persons, generally qualified in your field of expertise, to 
express opinions that, though contrary to yours, would likely be 
viewed by others in the field as representing legitimate and 
reasonable disagreement within your profession?23 
The court provided each expert with transcripts of a seven-day 
Daubert hearing and related exhibits, and instructed them not to 
communicate with the parties or each other. 
A.  The Expert Reports 
The reports filed by the three court-appointed experts 
demonstrate the diverse values that differing scientific disciplines 
employ in assessing an identical body of evidence.24  All 
acknowledged that the plaintiff’s experts had made the most of the 
data that existed, but differed in the extent to which they regarded 
such testimony as meeting the standards of “scientific knowledge.” 
Dr. David Savitz offered the most demanding standard for 
finding information to be sufficiently reliable to be deemed scientific 
knowledge: 
because the information is so indirectly applicable and 
hypothetical in nature, the application of it to form an opinion is 
not a “scientifically reliable” process.  The linkage between those 
shreds of potentially relevant information and the opinion that 
results is so murky that it is very difficult to see how the evidence 
leads to the opinions that are offered.  Applying any reasonable 
standards of scientific evidence as the basis for drawing a 
 
causation of another type in humans.”  Id. at 3. 
 23 Id. at 5-6.  This third question follows the format of a question to court-
appointed experts in the breast implant multidistrict litigation.  See Hooper et al., 
supra note 20, at 158. 
 24 Since the instructions to the court-appointed experts and the reports of those 
experts remain unpublished, I have provided extensive citation to the language of 
the instructions and reports. 
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conclusion leads to the judgment that we do not know enough to 
offer an opinion on this matter that is reasonably well grounded 
in science.25 
Dr. Savitz, an epidemiologist, was especially critical of the 
absence of human studies and unwilling to extrapolate findings 
across species, declaring that “[s]ome form of epidemiologic or 
clinical evidence, even if flawed and incomplete, is needed for 
drawing inferences about general causation in making a judgment 
about Parlodel and intracerebral hemorrhage.”26  Dr. Savitz 
acknowledged that causal attributions may be made without such 
studies if the causal pathway is clear; he then continued, “[i]n the 
absence of clinical or epidemiologic research, it would require a 
tremendous amount of indirect evidence to reach the point that even 
in the absence of research, the linkage is ‘obvious’ in the way that the 
tornado leading to injury is obvious.”27 
With respect to the third question involving the possibility of 
legitimate and reasonable disagreement within the profession 
regarding such views, Dr. Savitz acknowledged that views vary across 
sciences: 
[The] vast majority of scientists who routinely consider these sorts 
of evidence (epidemiologists, researchers in clinical medicine) 
would agree with my general conclusions.  If forced to guess the 
proportion, I would estimate 80% of my peers would concur.  
Those who study basic mechanisms of disease causation 
(physiologists, pharmacologists, toxicologists) might well dispute 
my views in that the plausibility based on those lines of evidence is 
more supportive of the potential for causality.  The 
counterargument to my view is that the diverse threads based on 
mechanism of actions for Parlodel, analogy to other agents in the 
same broad category of drug, and temporal linkage of the 
medication and the illness can be integrated scientifically into a 
scientifically reliable conclusion.  However, essentially all scientists 
recognize that when the issue is the causation of clinical disease in 
humans, there is a sizable gap between what is plausible based on 
indirect evidence and what is proven based on clinical and 
epidemiologic studies.  In the chain of reasoning, most scientists 
would likely share the view that leaping across the huge gulf of 
critical data moved the person making the inference beyond the 
 
 25 Memorandum from David A. Savitz, to Judge Donald J. Lee 4 (Sept. 31, 2001) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Savitz]. 
 26 Id. at 3. 
 27 Id. at 4. 
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scope of scientific assessment.28 
Dr. David Flockhart, a clinical pharmacologist, offered the least 
demanding standard for assessing a causal relationship.  Dr. 
Flockhart acknowledged that epidemiologic and clinical trial data 
would be helpful, but found it to be unnecessary in assessing a causal 
relationship: 
Many important and well-recognized adverse drug reactions are 
not documented by well conducted epidemiologic studies that 
have been specifically conducted to detect them and that we still 
believe that the weight of the scientific evidence is sufficient to 
implicate their involvement to such an extent that we would 
remove a drug from the market. . . .  Well conducted 
epidemiologic studies are of unquestionable value in this context 
when they are positive, but medical epidemiology is an inexact 
science, fraught with reliance on imperfect medical charts which 
are themselves really edited summaries of data available, or on 
ICD-9 codes or discharge diagnoses which may not reflect 
completely or accurately the actual course of events.  As a result 
epidemiology is a somewhat blunt tool with which to ask detailed 
questions about adverse drug events and interactions, since the 
possible causes of type 2 errors: i.e. missing drug reactions that 
are actually there, are legion.  Dr. Kulig used scientifically 
acceptable methodology in putting little reliance on the small 
amount of epidemiologic evidence available.29 
Dr. Flockhart also noted that 
most clinical practice is not guided by data from [prospective, 
randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trials], because they are 
so difficult and expensive to conduct.  In addition, aggregate data 
from such trials often do not apply to the specifics of individual 
cases.  To assert that any medical practice has no scientific basis 
because a randomized, placebo-controlled trial to answer the 
pertinent question was not conducted would be to obviate the vast 
majority of clinical practice.  It follows that other tools must 
usually be used to provide sufficient evidence to guide our 
practice.30 
Instead, Dr. Flockhart reasoned by analogy that evidence of 
vasoconstriction in peripheral arteries caused by Parlodel and related 
substances would permit the inference that Parlodel would cause 
similar vasoconstriction in cerebral arteries, leading to increased 
 
 28 Id. at 5-6. 
 29 Letter from David Flockhart, 2-3 (Dec. 24, 2001) (on file in the law review 
office) [hereinafter Flockhart]. 
 30 Id. at 4-5. 
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blood pressure, intracranial hemorrhage, and stroke.  Such reasoning 
presents an “analytical gap,” in the words of Joiner, that far exceeds 
the modest stretch allowed by Dr. Savitz. 
More specifically, Dr. Flockhart used a “weight of the evidence” 
approach to assess the effect of animal studies, case studies, and other 
available evidence.31  Unlike Dr. Savitz, Dr. Flockhart relied on a 
series of case studies, including one case study reported in a peer-
reviewed journal that recorded vasoconstriction changes in carotid 
arteries with the “challenge-dechallenge” (i.e., the introduction and 
removal) of a drug related to Parlodel (ergotamine tartrate): 
Case reports are often disparaged or discarded because they do 
not represent a plurality of events, but their strength is in making 
clear the possibility of an event, such as the possibility that Parlodel 
can cause vasoconstriction.  In the determination of the possibility 
of drug involvement in an adverse reaction there is little that can 
substitute for a well informed investigative physician being 
present at the time of an event, performing a targeted series of 
diagnostic tests and then describing it carefully to us all via 
publication in the medical literature.  A cause and effect 
relationship can be established even with a single case report if it 
is excellent.  The demonstration of challenge and dechallenge is 
a particularly persuasive method in this context, and while this 
would be impossible in the case of stroke, it has been 
demonstrated for Parlodel for the closest reasonable surrogate: 
vasoconstriction.32 
Dr. Flockhart also relied on a series of animal studies that 
indicated that Parlodel could cause vasoconstriction in peripheral 
arteries.  After noting that doses are difficult to equate due to 
different metabolic rates, and that animals may have different 
pharmacologic receptors, Dr. Flockhart suggested that such studies 
can demonstrate the possibility of an effect, but they cannot carry 
the same weight as studies conducted in people or in human 
tissues.  The data described in Exhibit 1013 indicating that 
Parlodel can cause superficial epithelial necrosis of dependant ear 
margins in dogs with long hanging ears demonstrate the possibility 
that the drug can bring about vasoconstriction in mammalian 
blood vessel in vivo even though the doses that were used were 
 
 31 “To arrive at reasonable proof of a causal link in an individual case, one will 
commonly have to bring together different elements of evidence, none of which taken 
separately may be determinant, but which when viewed as a whole may be considered 
convincing.”  Id. at 2 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted); see also Vern 
R. Walker, Risk Characterization and the Weight of the Evidence: Adapting Gatekeeping 
Concepts from the Courts, 16 RISK ANALYSIS 793 (1996). 
 32 Flockhart, supra note 30, at 3. 
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high.33 
Dr. Flockhart then cited a number of published and 
unpublished references to the vascoconstrictive properties of 
Parlodel and other ergot derivatives and gave special weight to 
statements by the drug manufacturer that the risk of myocardial 
infarction or stroke exceeded the benefit of the drug for postpartum 
lactation, leading the FDA to withdraw its approval of Parlodel for 
this indication. 
Dr. Flockhart acknowledged that none of the bits of evidence, 
considered individually, would be sufficient to support a finding of 
general causation, but “when viewed as a whole make a convincing 
case that Parlodel can cause stroke.”34 
Turning to the question of specific causation, Dr. Flockhart 
examined the differential diagnosis technique used by the plaintiff’s 
two experts to rule out a number of plausible alternative causes of the 
stroke.  Notably, Dr. Flockhart specifically did not exclude the 
possibility that the stroke was due to an elevated rate of unexplained 
stroke in postpartum women, since “it is unreasonable, and 
scientifically untenable, to hold that such rare strokes happen for no 
describable reason at all.  It is likely that were each of these to be as 
closely examined as was Ms. Soldo’s stroke, a scientifically plausible 
cause might well be found for each of them.”35 
While Dr. Flockhart found the differential diagnosis of Dr. Kulig 
to be scientifically acceptable, he found the differential diagnosis of 
Dr. Petro to fall short of the mark.  Dr. Petro acknowledged that the 
cold medication Contac, which the plaintiff took, contains 
phenylpropanolamine (PPA) and may have been a contributing 
factor to the plaintiff’s stroke, but offered no explanation for why he 
concluded that it was not the sole cause.  According to Dr. Flockhart, 
this failure to exclude a specific plausible alternative cause through 
differential diagnosis rendered the methodology unreliable and 
inappropriate to the facts of the case.36 
The third court-appointed expert, Dr. William J. Powers, a 
neurologist, offered an opinion that staked out an intermediate 
position regarding the requirements for recognizing “scientific 
knowledge.”  Dr. Powers was willing to tolerate an “analytical gap” 
somewhat larger than Dr. Savitz, but which fell short of that accepted 
 
 33 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 4. 
 36 The expert report of Dr. Kulig does not mention this possibility, suggesting 
that he was not presented with this possibility. 
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by Dr. Flockhart.  When Dr. Powers applied this standard to the 
proffered testimony of the plaintiff’s experts, he too found it lacked 
sufficient scientific rigor.37 
Dr. Powers also acknowledged that clinical or epidemiologic 
data are not necessary to declare a causal relationship, but objected 
to reasoning by analogy that evidence of vasoconstriction in 
peripheral and carotid arteries is indicative of a similar relationship 
in cranial arteries.  In the absence of specific evidence, human or 
animal, that Parlodel causes vasoconstriction in cerebral arteries, he 
found the assertion of such an association to be without scientific 
foundation: 
Even more importantly, the review of evidence by Dr. Kulig does 
not consider the extensive scientific literature documenting that 
cerebral arteries respond differently to drugs of the ergot class 
than do peripheral vessels.  Many studies indicate that ergots do 
not cause cerebral arterial vasoconstriction even though they do 
cause peripheral arterial vasoconstriction.  The statement that 
cerebral vasoconstriction can cause intracerebral hemorrhage is 
not supported or substantiated by any observations or evidence in 
humans or animal models.  As far as I am aware, no such data 
exists.38 
Dr. Powers then applied the nine Bradford-Hill criteria for assessing 
causation to the proffered testimony, and found that it satisfied only 
one of the criteria—temporal sequence.39 
Dr. Powers then assessed the differential diagnoses presented by 
the experts and found them lacking in scientific rigor.  After noting 
that the differential diagnoses were appropriate and complete for 
ruling out a number of common causes of stroke, Dr. Powers noted 
that the process used to rule out other causes and implicate Parlodel 
“is logically flawed.”  He noted three flaws.  First, the theory that 
intracerebral hemorrhage is part of a symptom of ergotism,40 which 
 
 37 Memorandum from William J. Powers, to Judge Donald J. Lee 1 (July 11, 2001) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Powers]. 
 38 Id. at 2 (internal citation omitted). 
 39 Here too there appears to be a difference in interpretation across the sciences, 
since Dr. Savitz indicated in his report that the Bradford-Hill criteria are to be used 
“as a means of interpreting an established association based on a body of 
epidemiologic research for the purpose of trying to judge whether the observed 
association reflects a causal relation between an exposure and a disease.”  Savitz, 
supra note 26, at 4. 
 40 Ergotism is “a chronic poisoning produced by ingestion of ergot [a fungus that 
attacks plants], marked by cerebrospinal symptoms, spasm, cramps, a kind of dry 
gangrene of the extremities, and burning pain related to intense peripheral 
vasoconstriction.”  MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING 
AND ALLIED HEALTH 471 (7th ed. 2000).  Parlodel is an ergot derivative. 
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can be caused by Parlodel, is weakened by the fact that there were no 
symptoms of ergotism at the time of hospital admission for 
intracerebral hemorrhage.  Second, the party’s experts provided no 
adequate explanation for why Parlodel was more likely to cause the 
intracerebral hemorrhage than the Contac medication, which 
includes PPA, a product linked with intracerebral hemorrhage.  
Third, the party’s experts provided no adequate reason for excluding 
the post-partum state itself as the cause.41 
Having found that the testimony by the party’s experts was not 
scientifically reliable, Dr. Powers then assessed the extent to which 
others in his field might express a contrary opinion that represents “a 
legitimate and responsible disagreement within [the] profession.”  
Dr. Powers admitted that others outside his specialty of experimental 
pharmacology of the cerebral circulation might disagree because they 
are unfamiliar with the published scientific evidence regarding the 
difference in response of the cerebral vasculature and peripheral 
vasculature to ergot class drugs, and that such knowledge is typically 
not part of the training of specialists in the broader fields of 
neurology and cerebrovascular disease.  Moreover, he noted that 
medical textbooks and peer-reviewed articles contain contrary views: 
The statement that cerebral vasoconstriction can cause 
intracerebral hemorrhage may be argued in the affirmative based 
on the occurrence of intracerebral hemorrhage in the conditions 
of hypertensive encephalopathy and declampsia and the belief 
that these conditions are caused by cerebral vasospasm.  Although 
the best available evidence indicates that cerebral vasospasm is 
not present in hypertensive encephalopathy or eclampsia, this is 
still a commonly held belief that can be found in textbooks and 
review articles.42 
In conclusion, Dr. Powers stated that in the absence of a clear 
cause for the hemorrhage, some measure of subjective judgment is 
required in assessing the evidence, and other persons, generally 
qualified in this field of expertise, may legitimately disagree: 
My conclusion that neither Dr. Kulig or Dr. Petro provides 
adequate justification to rule out other causes of intracerebral 
hemorrhage and implicate Parlodel as the primary cause is a 
subjective judgment based [on] my reading of the evidence and 
other persons, generally qualified in this field of expertise, may 
legitimately disagree because no other clear cause for the 
 
 41 Powers, supra note 37, at 3. 
 42 Id. at 6. 
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hemorrhage was established.43 
B.  The Court’s Decision 
One can imagine the disappointment, perhaps even regret, felt 
by the judge when he reviewed these court appointed experts’ three 
independent and inconsistent decisions.  It is likely that in calling for 
independent assessments from three different specialties, he hoped 
that the opinions would converge, thereby strengthening this 
assessment of the scientific methodology underlying the experts’ 
opinions.  Instead, he ended up with three opinions that shared little 
common ground. 
Of course, the judge could have lessened the likelihood of 
disagreement by permitting the experts to consult together in 
reaching their opinions, as judges have in other cases.44  Such 
consultation would have allowed each decision to be informed by the 
opinion of the others.  The difference between Dr. Flockhart and Dr. 
Powers over the propriety of using research on noncranial arteries as 
a basis for inferring a similar effect on cranial arteries may have been 
resolved if they had the benefit of each other’s thinking.  Other 
conflicts, however, likely would have persisted, such as differences 
over the need for clinical or epidemiologic studies as a basis for a 
causal attribution in such cases.  I believe the judge should be 
commended for soliciting independent views without consultation, 
since these views give a more accurate assessment of the variation of 
opinion that exists within the various branches of science.  Judges 
should resolve such conflicts within the constraints of legal doctrines, 
rather than encourage the experts to negotiate among themselves to 
find a common resolution that they can present to the court.  In fact, 
it is the resolution of the conflicts among the legitimate views across 
the sciences that, in my opinion, poses the greatest difficulty to the 
faithful application of the gatekeeping responsibility for expert 
testimony. 
At first glance, one might assume that three different opinions 
from highly qualified experts appointed by the court, in itself, would 
be evidence of “a legitimate and responsible disagreement” within 
the relevant sciences regarding material issues and requiring that the 
disputed issues be presented to a jury.  Moreover, the two court-
appointed experts who found the plaintiff’s testimony lacking in 
scientific integrity acknowledged the existence of “legitimate and 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Hooper et al., supra note 20, at 161-64. 
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responsible disagreement” within the profession.45 
Sanders presumably would allow the jury to consider such 
different views, assuming the jury is capable of comprehending the 
differences in the views between the parties’ experts and appointed 
experts and resolving these differences in a thoughtful and reasoned 
way.  If the purpose  of restrictions on admissibility is to “shelter 
jurors from their own shortcomings” when they are unable to 
distinguish between good and bad testimony and will, therefore, “be 
more likely to reach an incorrect conclusion,”46 is there a need for 
such protection when the breadth of legitimate scientific views is as 
great as indicated by the opinions of the court-appointed experts?  It 
is hard to imagine that the jury could not find a defensible decision 
within this span of views. 
The court, however, took no comfort in the diversity of views 
presented by the court-appointed experts.  Faced with such 
conflicting opinions, the court attempted to reconcile disputes over 
scientific validity that the scientific community itself had shied away 
from.  In doing so, the court unavoidably stepped beyond the bounds 
of assessing whether the methodology and techniques employ the 
same degree of intellectual rigor appropriate to the profession and 
instead established legal policy regarding how such disputes among 
scientists are to be reconciled under law. 
In an opinion that extends more than 100 pages, the court 
dissected the views of Dr. Flockhart and the plaintiff’s experts, and 
concluded that the opinions expressed by the plaintiff’s experts must 
be excluded since they “failed to use a reliable scientific 
methodology” to demonstrate general causation and specific 
causation.  Having excluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s experts, 
the court then granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant.47 
 
 45 Dr. Savitz did not answer precisely the question regarding the extent to which 
a contrary opinion “would likely be viewed by others in the field as representing 
legitimate and reasonable disagreement within your profession.”  Instead, he 
indicated that “80% of my peers would concur” with his determination, leaving 20% 
who may disagree.  Savitz, supra note 25, at 5.  Dr. Savitz also notes that “most 
scientists would likely share the view that leaping across the huge gulf of critical data 
moved the person making the inference beyond the scope of scientific assessment.”  
Id. at 6.  Dr. Powers notes that a contrary view “is still a commonly held belief that 
can be found in textbooks and review articles,” suggesting that the contrary view may 
even be generally accepted.  Powers, supra note 37, at 6. 
 46 Sanders, supra note 1, at 891. 
 47 In doing so, the court “adopted almost verbatim most of the proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the defendant for the reason those 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law correctly reflect the facts in the 
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In considering the testimony of the plaintiff’s experts, the court 
indicated “differential diagnosis alone cannot establish causation to a 
degree of medical certainty in a case involving a disease as common 
as stroke.”48  Given that approximately one-third of all strokes go 
undiagnosed as to their cause, “the scientific way to determine 
whether bromocriptine increases the risk of stroke in humans is 
through a proper controlled clinical or epidemiologic study.”49 
The court’s examination of Dr. Flockhart views is particularly 
informative of the manner in which many federal courts consider 
expert testimony.  It examined each element of evidence on which 
Dr. Flockhart based his opinion, and pointed out that each one 
demonstrates only the possibility that Parlodel can cause intracranial 
hemorrhage and stroke.  The court made clear that epidemiology 
studies or clinical trials are not essential to establishing causation, but 
endorsed Dr. Savitz’s view that the absence of such studies would 
require “a tremendous amount of indirect evidence” to establish 
causation.50  As an example, the court mentioned that “a scientifically 
valid understanding of the alleged mechanism by which Parlodel 
allegedly causes vasoconstriction could be important indirect 
evidence, but it [did] not exist in this case.”51  At a later point, the 
court noted that such a linkage must be obvious, “in the way that the 
tornado leading to injury is obvious.”52 
The court then dismissed the clinical case reports, since they 
demonstrated only the possibility of a causal relationship.  As to the 
published case report that demonstrates vasoconstriction in the 
presence of a drug closely related to Parlodel using a 
challenge/dechallenge methodology, the court noted that the 
authors suggested only the “possible” causal relationship, and that 
the case report demonstrated only coronary vasoconstriction and not 
vasoconstriction of cerebral arteries or stroke.53 
The court then dismissed the animal studies that Dr. Flockhart 
and the plaintiff’s experts relied on, noting again that such studies 
demonstrated only the possibility of a causal relationship and do not 
explain adequately how such data relate to humans.  The court was 
 
record as well as relevant law.”  Soldo, 2003 WL 355931, at *2 n.2. 
 48 Id. at *9. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at *72. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at *74. 
 53 Soldo, 2003 WL 355931, at *83. Of course, there can be no 
challenge/dechallenge demonstration of a stroke, since the effect of a stroke is not 
reversible. 
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especially skeptical of a study of vasoconstriction in the peripheral 
arteries of the ears of dogs: 
[D]espite the fact that Dr. Flockhart and plaintiff’s experts 
recognize that human studies carry greater weight than animal 
studies, they provide no explanation for why they give more 
weight to an animal study showing alleged effects in the 
“dependent ear margins in dogs with long hanging ears” than 
negative human studies or human studies demonstrating 
vasodilation, given that plaintiff is not a dog and does not have 
long hanging ears.”54 
The court then turned to the distinction raised by Dr. Powers 
between the reaction of cerebral arteries and other vascular systems, 
and noted: 
Plaintiff experts who claim that Parlodel acts like all other ergots 
to allegedly cause vasoconstriction, provide no reliable means of 
distinguishing studies showing that cerebral arteries respond 
differently to ergots than do peripheral vessels [citation omitted] . 
. . .  Studies showing that cerebral arteries respond differently to 
ergots than do peripheral vessels invalidate plaintiff’s expert’s 
efforts to reason by analogy from scientific data regarding alleged 
vasoconstriction of the peripheral vessels. 
The court then criticized the experts for failing to rule out a 
number of other possible causes, such as caffeine, smoking, stress, 
hormones, PPA exposure due to Contac cold medication, and blood 
abnormalities.  After observing that the plaintiff’s experts failed to 
rule out the postpartum period or idiopathic stroke as possible causes 
of the intracranial hemorrhage, the court then questioned Dr. 
Flockhart’s approval of this practice.  Noting that Dr. Flockhart 
asserted that “[i]t is likely that were each of these [postpartum 
intracranial hemorrhages] to be as closely examined as was Ms. 
Soldo’s[,] that a scientifically plausible cause [other than the 
postpartum period] might well be found for each of them.”55  The 
court then stated that Dr. Flockhart offered no support for these 
statements other than his own ipse dixit.56 
The court did not explicitly address Dr. Flockhart’s “totality of 
the evidence” test, but did not appear to give weight to the fact that 
different kinds of evidence point in the same direction.  Quoting Dr. 
Savitz, the court noted that while expert opinions may make 
“appropriate use of all of the available information, [] in the 
 
 54 Id. at *77 (internal citations omitted). 
 55 Id. at *87. 
 56 Id. 
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absence of some minimum amount or level of scientific evidence, 
the opinions cannot be scientifically derived because there is too 
little science from which to derive them.” 
 Although it is sometimes necessary in a clinical, regulatory, or 
business practice to make decisions based on less than sufficient 
and/or reliable scientific evidence due to practical demands 
requiring immediate decision-making, such guesses, although 
perhaps reasonable hypotheses based on the best available 
evidence, do not constitute a scientifically reliable approach when 
used to assess causality via the scientific method.57 
In conclusion, the court voiced its agreement with Drs. Powers 
and Savitz: 
The body of scientific evidence relating to Parlodel and stroke is 
simply insufficient to support a scientifically reliable application 
of plaintiff’s expert methodology. . . .  Without sufficient reliable 
evidence of general causation, plaintiff’s experts could not 
reliably apply a differential diagnosis that comports with the 
scientific method, notwithstanding the fact that physicians in 
clinical practice may be required to proceed with a differential 
diagnosis on the basis of guesses or hypotheses due to the 
exigency of the need to treat their patients.58 
II.  THE QUEST FOR IPSE DIXIT 
Soldo reveals what other decisions have obscured: in making a 
gatekeeping determination the court must reconcile conflicting 
values of numerous sciences, each with differing intellectual 
processes, differing assumptions, and differing degrees of tolerance 
for extrapolation from scientific studies to human circumstances.  
Conflicts among the three court-appointed experts could not be 
attributed to party sponsorship or adversarial presentation.  Even 
when free of distortions imposed by the legal forum, distinguished 
scholars from different disciplines will invoke diverse standards and 
practices in assessing evidence and may reach divergent conclusions 
regarding the presence or absence of a causal relationship. 
In resolving such conflicts through an admissibility 
determination, courts do more than exert paternalist vigilance to 
compensate for juries’ perceived shortcomings.  It is not clear, in 
light of the research cited by Sanders, that a jury would be incapable 
of understanding the different positions of the parties’ experts and 
reaching a reasonable decision.  By dismissing the report by the 
 
 57 Id. at *69-70 (internal citations omitted). 
 58 Id. at *95. 
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court-appointed clinical pharmacologist as failing to meet a sufficient 
standard of scientific reliability, the court was in fact establishing a 
legal threshold for sufficiency that was independent of any uniform 
scientific standard.  The court made clear that the fact that a clinical 
pharmacologist employs “in the courtroom the same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field” is not sufficient for consideration by a jury.  For the 
Soldo court and a good many others, admissible evidence requires 
more than meeting appropriate standards of professional practice; it 
also requires demonstration of a relationship through methodologies 
that are not an essential part of clinical practice. 
The court in Soldo indicated as much when it noted that even if 
the plaintiff’s experts’ opinions were admissible under Daubert, “such 
evidence provides but a scintilla of support for plaintiff’s position and 
would not be sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that 
plaintiff’s ICH had been caused by Parlodel.”59  One might argue that 
this is a more appropriate basis for such a decision, rather than 
striking the testimony as inadmissible due to some perceived flaw in 
the methodology and reasoning.  Even if the experts use methods 
and reasoning appropriate to their profession, the courts may set, as a 
matter of law, a minimum threshold for evidence that is sufficient to 
justify submission to a jury.  Of course, if such a standard is 
established in an explicit manner as insufficient as a matter of law, 
that decision would be subject to appellate review on a de novo basis 
and therefore more vulnerable to reversal on appeal.  Such an 
approach, however, would seem preferable to declaring that broadly 
approved professional practices are scientifically unsound, and 
therefore, do not meet the standards for admissibility. 
Coming to terms with the role of the courts in setting such 
sufficiency standards will not be easy.  As Cohen points out, in these 
circumstances the vocabulary of science may obscure as much as it 
reveals.60  Courts utilizing scientific terms assign them different 
meanings, thereby obscuring the values that are being endorsed and 
diverting scientists who seek to appear as experts into meaningless 
debates about whether their declarations are “scientifically valid.”  
The courts cannot resolve the diverse views and values that 
characterize the scientific academy; one science’s accepted 
methodology may be another science’s ipse dixit.  A court can, 
however, specify a minimum threshold for admissible scientific 
evidence, and make clear that in doing so it is establishing a legal 
 
 59 Id. at *93. 
 60 Cohen, supra note 2, at 944-45; see also id. Parts II & III. 
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standard and not assessing the ephemeral concept of “scientific 
validity. 
